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Abstract

We explored the relationship between belief change and recollection of previous beliefs.
Subjects reported beliefs about TV violence. Later, subjects read a one-sided, belief inconsistent
text. We manipulated whether subjects reported beliefs after reading first, or recollected previous
beliefs first. A third group was told their previous beliefs before reporting current beliefs.
Recollections were not improved when subjects recollected beliefs first. When told previous
beliefs, belief change was reduced, suggesting a desire to appear consistent.
Keywords: text comprehension, beliefs
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Belief Change and Memory for Previous Beliefs after Comprehension of Contentious Scientific
Information
There is no argument that people forget things over time. The longer the time-span, the
more likely we are to forget. When we look at our own past, we reconstruct it through hindsight
in light of our experiences that have taken place since the original memory. In the words of Ross
& Conway (1986), “we forget, and we fill in the gaps in memory by inferring what probably
happened” (p.123). This phenomenon holds true for people’s attitudes and beliefs. Attitudes can
change gradually over time. Research has shown they may also change abruptly, in the face of
convincing arguments (Bem & McConnell, 1970; Goethals & Reckman, 1973; McFarland &
Ross, 1987; Levine, 1997; Ross, 1985). Additionally, this research has shown that when people
change their attitudes, they incorrectly report their previous beliefs or attitudes as being similar
to their newly formed attitudes (Bem & McConnell, 1970; Goethals & Reckman, 1973;
McFarland & Ross, 1987; Levine, 1997; Levine, Lench, & Safer, 2009; Ross, 1985; Wolfe,
2013). This bias in recall has been demonstrated for attitudes such as frequency of tooth brushing
(Ross, McFarland, Fletcher, 1981), attitudes toward exercise (Ross, 1985), and bussing to
achieve racial integration (Goethals & Reckman, 1973). Subjects in these studies reported their
attitudes, then later experimenters manipulated their attitudes by instructing them to write
counter-attitudinal essays or take part in a discussion with a confederate, who was given strong
arguments against subjects’ original attitude and did most of the talking, before then reporting
their new attitudes and being asked to recall their original ones. Individuals in all of these
experiments consistently showed a change in attitude following the manipulation.
Wolfe (2013) demonstrated the same effect among students studying scientific
information about a contentious topic. Students who believed spanking was effective versus
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ineffective read scientific texts that were inconsistent with their beliefs. Students changed beliefs
following reading, and then overestimated the similarity between their original beliefs and their
new ones.
The relationship between current beliefs and recollection of previous beliefs is not well
understood. Perhaps the most influential factor involved when we attempt to remember
previously held beliefs is our present mental state. Not only is it most salient but also because we
often assume such beliefs to be relatively stable over time unless there is an obvious reason that
they should not be (Ross & Conway, 1986).
Ross & Conway (1986) reason that when individuals attempt to reconstruct personal
histories, they adopt implicit theories of either stability or change. What motivates us to adopt
either theory is unclear and varies across contexts. In general, people are inclined to view
themselves as consistent in their beliefs, abilities and personality (Ross & Conway, 1986). There
is debate over the mechanism involved in this assumption of consistency. Cognitive dissonance
creates a feeling of discomfort or embarrassment when an individual posses two or more
contradictory beliefs (Festinger, 1957). Goethals & Reckman (1973) argue that knowledge of
one’s own inconsistency of attitudes may induce cognitive dissonance. Individuals subsequently
distort their recollection of past attitudes as to appear consistent with current beliefs in order to
reduce this dissonance. This explanation requires individuals to assume consistency of attitudes
however, as noted by Ross & Conway (1986), it also requires belief change to be salient to
subjects for them alter their recollections. Biased memory for previous attitudes has also been
interpreted as a product of impression management (Bem & McConnell, 1970). Similar to
dissonance theory, impression management motivates individuals to appear consistent over time.
Where this differs from the former is that the motivation stems from the impressions of others on
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the individual rather than the subjects’ impression of themselves. However, neither is always the
case in all attitude-manipulation experiments. In many of the experiments, including our own,
the true purpose is disguised, and therefore subjects have no reason to believe they are being
judged on the consistency of their attitudes, but rather the accuracy of their memory. We would
assume subjects to be motivated toward performing well on tasks that they perceive are related to
the purpose of the study. Therefore subjects may not experience dissonance just because their
beliefs changed during the course of the study. Yet subjects in previous studies who change their
attitudes are often unaware that they have changed and still assume cognitive temporal
consistency (Ross & Conway, 1986).
The present study attempts to shed light on these possible explanations. In this study, all
subjects read a scientific text that is inconsistent with a prior belief the subject holds. We attempt
to replicate Wolfe (2013) with a new topic, TV violence causing real aggression, and address two
factors that may be involved in this relationship. First, stating a current belief may interfere with
people’s ability to recollect previous beliefs. In previous research, current beliefs are stated
before recollections. Stating a belief and then recalling how one felt earlier may be motivating
subjects to recall past beliefs as similar to the current ones. If recollections are generated without
interference from current beliefs, they may be more accurate. We address this possibility by
manipulating the order that subjects state current vs. recollected beliefs. The first condition is
similar to the typical recollection paradigm used by previous research where subjects’ beliefs are
first manipulated, and then they give a rating of their current belief before recalling what they
originally reported several weeks earlier. We add an additional condition where the order of
reporting current belief and then recalling the original is reversed. Subjects in the second
condition rate their beliefs in the topic of TV violence along with other filler topics, to serve as a
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manipulation check, then are invited back later and presented with a text that is inconsistent with
their belief on TV violence. We then ask them to first recall their original beliefs before asking
them to rate their present beliefs. By comparing belief change and subsequent memory bias
between these two conditions we will be able to examine first, whether we succeed in replicating
the belief change phenomenon for TV violence and second, whether the act of explicitly stating a
belief affects recollection more because the present attitude is more salient. If we find a
difference between these two conditions, it would suggest that individuals are aware of belief
change but alter recollections to appear consistent.
Second, the relationship between current and previous beliefs may be driven by a desire
to appear consistent across time (Ross & Conway, 1986; Ross, 1989). People may experience
dissonance after changing beliefs (Festinger, 1957). This dissonance may be resolved by altering
the reporting of current or recollected beliefs so they appear similar. We address this possibility
with a third condition where subjects are reminded of their previous belief before reporting their
current belief. Rather than asking subjects to recall their earlier belief, we tell subjects what they
reported and then ask them to rate their current belief. Since we are reminding subjects of their
past beliefs, we cannot measure any bias in memory for these beliefs. We can, however, examine
whether a desire for consistency will affect a belief change manipulation. If subjects desire to
appear consistent, current beliefs after a reminder would be more similar to previous beliefs than
when there is no reminder. For a more detailed representation of the present design, see figure 1.
Our manipulations at time 2, for all conditions, of the order of post-belief report and
recollections for the first two conditions as well as the reminder of pre-beliefs for the third
condition are all presented in Figure 1.
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An additional goal is to address potential consequences of belief recollection errors. We
examine the hypothesis that subjects who more accurately recollect that their beliefs have
changed will be more interested in reading texts about this topic. The basic logic of this
prediction is that if a subject has a large error in recollecting his or her previous beliefs, they may
erroneously believe that their beliefs have not changed. In that circumstance, subjects may
believe that reading new information on the same controversial topic will be unlikely to change
their beliefs. In contrast, a subject who more accurately recollects that his or her belief has
indeed changed may more likely be aware that their beliefs do change when they read new
information. Under that circumstance, subjects may be more willing or interested in reading
further information about the topic. We address this question with a task in which subjects rate
their interest in reading a number of new articles, some of which are one-sided articles relating to
our topic of television violence.
Method
Subjects
One hundred sixty six subjects from a large Midwestern United States University
participated. Subjects were selected based on their reported beliefs concerning television
violence from a prescreening test at the beginning of the semester. One hundred sixty
participated in exchange for partial credit in an Introductory Psychology course, and six received
a ten-dollar gift card. Data from 16 subjects were discarded due to failure to follow directions or
computer error.
Materials
Two texts were created that present one-sided arguments regarding the scientific literature
related to the potential link between television violence and aggression. In the “TV Yes” text,
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evidence is presented that suggests viewing television violence causes people to commit real
violence. One section discusses how children are naturally predisposed to imitate adult behavior
whether that behavior is appropriate or not. Two other sections discuss aggression in towns
before and after television were introduced and longitudinal research. The text is 1,815 words
with 19 paragraphs and has a Flesch-Kincaid grade level score of 11.7. The “TV No” text
suggests that there is not enough evidence to make a causal conclusion about the link between
television and actual violence. Some of the same research topics in the TV Yes text are discussed.
Problems with the research and inconsistent findings are used to make a case that the causal link
is inconclusive. The TV No text is 1,898 words with 19 paragraphs and has a Flesch-Kincaid
grade level score of 10.6.
The prior knowledge test consists of 20 4-option multiple-choice questions. The
questions address terminology and basic research findings in media and violence research. The
sentence recognition test utilized 60 sentences, with 30 taken from each text. For each text, every
sentence was rated by a separate group of subjects on two dimensions: the extent to which the
sentence supports the proposition and the extent to which the sentence refutes the proposition.
Support and refute ratings were used in a different capacity for an earlier study by Wolfe et. al.
(2013) and are on a continuous scale. In the present study, the ten sentences with the highest
support ratings from each text were used as support sentences. The mean rating for the ten
support sentences from the ‘TV Yes’ text was 7.64 and 7.23 for the ten from the ‘TV No’ text.
The ten sentences with the highest refute ratings were used as the refute sentences. The mean
rating for the ten refute sentences within the TV Yes text was 5.18 and 6.38 for the ten from the
TV No text. Ten sentences that were neutral on both ratings were used as neutral sentences. The
specific sentences that serve as target and distractors depend on which text is read. For each
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subject, the sentences from the text read are targets (old), and the sentences from the other text
are distractors (new). Each sentence can be characterized in terms of the extent to which it both
supports and refutes the text position.
The PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994) is a sixty-item measure of emotional states. The
PANAS-X measures positive affect and negative affect as general emotional states. The Need for
Cognition (NFC) scale (Cacioppo, & Petty, 1982) is a measure of “the tendency for an
individual to engage in and enjoy thinking'' (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). The NFC has eighteen
items that the individual rates using a 9-point Likert-style scale.
Belief change was measured by comparing the belief ratings of each subject, pre and post
manipulation on the topic of TV violence and other filler topics, which we did not manipulate.
Filler topics included homosexuality as a choice, spanking as disciplinary tool, and social
media’s effect on relationships. Filler topics served as a manipulation check to ensure the texts
used produced significant belief change. Ratings were measured using a 1 (strongly disagree) to
9 (strongly agree), Likert-style scale. The difference between pre beliefs and post beliefs gave us
a measure of belief change. For example if, in the prescreening, a subject responded to the
statement “viewing television violence causes people to commit real violence” with 9 (strongly
agree) but after manipulation reported 4 (moderately disagree) they have a belief change score of
5. Recollection bias was measured by comparing recollection ratings to the original pre beliefs.
For instance, if a subject rated their belief in the topic as 9 but their recollection were 5, we
subtracted the original belief rating from the recollection to get a recollection bias rating of 4.
Memory for the text content was assessed with a sentence recognition task. Recognition
was measured using signal detection theory (Swets, 1964). d’ is a measure of subjects’ ability to
discriminate sentences that were read from sentences that were not read. The logic of the test is
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that subjects with better comprehension of the text will have a better ability to discriminate
sentences they read from sentences they did not read. d’ was calculated separately for support,
refute, and neutral sentences. Ten old and ten new sentences were used for each sentence type.
Thus, there were a total of twenty support sentences; twenty refute sentences, and twenty neutral
sentences. Position consistent sentences were supporting sentences within the ‘TV Yes’ text and
refuting sentences in the ‘TV No’ text. Position inconsistent sentences were refuting sentences
within the ‘TV Yes’ text and supporting sentences within the ‘TV No’ text.
For the article-rating task, subjects rated their interest in reading each of twenty articles
based on their titles using a Likert-style scale (1=not interested at all, 9=very interested). Of the
twenty titles, three clearly support the proposition that viewing TV violence causes real violence
(Watching Violence Makes for Angry Kids, Study Shows; TV Bloodbath: How Violent TV Makes
Violent Teens; Media Violence: Why We Like it and Why it's Making Us so Violent) and three
titles clearly refute the position: (Television and Violence: What We Watch Does Not Make Us
Who We Are; Yes TV is Violent. But Does it Make us Violent? No; and Research Shows Violent
Media do not Cause Violent Behavior). The remaining article titles address topics that are
unrelated to Television violence and aggression.
Procedure
Subjects’ reported beliefs about TV violence effects as part of a prescreening survey
within the first two weeks of the semester. The on-line survey was self-paced, and contained
unrelated questions pertaining to other experiments. Subjects reported their belief in the
proposition that viewing television violence causes people to commit real violence on a ninepoint scale (1 = “completely disbelieve”, 5 = “unsure whether I believe this”, and 9 =
“completely believe”). Subjects who responded 1-3 on the belief scale were classified as
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disbelievers and subjects who responded 7-9 were classified as believers. Believers and
disbelievers were invited by email to sign up for the actual experiment.
The experiment took place anywhere from 2 to 12 weeks after the on-line prescreening.
All parts of the experiment were run individually at computer terminals, with up to four other
subjects per session. Subjects began by completing the multiple-choice test. Subjects were
assigned to read the text that was inconsistent with their belief on TV violence from the
prescreening. Both texts were read one sentence at a time in a moving window fashion. The text
appeared one paragraph at a time with all letters converted to dashes (-), except for the current
sentence. Punctuation was maintained. Section titles appeared with the first paragraph of each
section and were treated as separate sentences. Subjects were instructed to read each sentence
until they understood it, and then press the spacebar. At that point, the current sentence turned
back into dashes and the next sentence turned from dashes to text. After the last sentence of a
paragraph, the first sentence of the next paragraph appeared as text with the rest of the paragraph
as dashes. Following the text, subjects completed the PANAS-X and Need for Cognition scale to
serve as a delay.
Following the questionnaires, subjects were reminded of the responses they gave to
statements in the prescreening. Subjects were told that the purpose of the reminder was to verify
that their data had been correctly matched. An experimenter sat individually with the subject and
read responses the subject reported on the prescreening. Subjects verified that the responses were
ones they had reported. Subjects in both the current belief first and recollection first conditions
verified seven responses including the filler topics that were unrelated to TV violence. Subjects
in the previous belief given condition verified their responses to the same seven items and also
verified their TV violence belief rating.
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After completing the verification task, subjects reported current and recollected beliefs
for TV violence and filler topics according to their condition. In the “current belief first”
condition, subjects reported their beliefs and then recollected their previous belief from the
prescreening. In the “recollection first” condition, this order was reversed. In the “previous belief
given” condition, subjects only reported their current beliefs after being reminded of their
responses in the verification task.
Subjects next completed the sentence recognition task. Sixty sentences were presented
one at a time, randomized for each subject. Instructions stated that subjects should decide if each
sentence was presented word-for-word in the text they read. If so, they pressed a button labeled
“old”, and if not, they pressed the “new” button. The task was self-paced. Next, subjects
completed the article-rating task at their own pace. Titles appeared one at a time on the
computer; subjects rated their interest in reading each article on a nine-point scale. Finally,
subjects were debriefed and dismissed.
Results
We examined the extent to which reading a one-sided scientific text, which is inconsistent
with an individual’s previously reported belief, affects subjects’ reporting of their current belief
and the magnitude of recollection error when asked to recall the originally reported belief. Other
questions we address are whether order effects of recollection and reported beliefs at time two or
reminding subjects of their earlier beliefs impact these findings. We also investigated subjects’
interest in seeking new information as a consequence of belief change and recollection bias.
Analysis of sentence reading times, Need for Cognition, and Positive/Negative Affect did not
predict any belief change or recollection bias so we will not discuss them any further.
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Belief Change and Belief Memory Bias
Belief ratings for half of the scores were flipped (i.e. scores of 1 were changed to 9, 2 was
changed to 8, 3 to 7, and 4 to 6). It was not a goal of our study to distinguish believers from
disbelievers and we did not anticipate there to be any significant differences between the two.
Our concern was to assess the magnitude of belief change in both groups. By flipping half of the
ratings, we were able to have a single, positive measure of belief change. Mean belief change
and recollection bias scores for TV violence and filler topics within each condition are shown in
Table 1. Belief change for the experimental topic of TV violence was significantly greater than
for the filler topics. The mean belief change score for TV Violence was 2.73 among both groups
compared to the filler topics that all had a mean belief change score of around 1 (see Table 1).
The “post first” condition replicates Wolfe (2013). Subjects that reported beliefs then recollected
previous beliefs had a mean belief change of 2.51 (Table 2). These recollections were more
similar to current than previous beliefs. Mean recollection bias score within this condition was
1.47. When the belief recollections were reported first, post beliefs and recollections were not
significantly different than in the Post first condition. Mean belief change for recollection first
was 2.73 and the mean recollection bias was 1.98 (Table 2). In both conditions, recollections
were significantly different from pre beliefs, and similar to post beliefs. Multiple regressions
assessed the variance in pre recollections that is accounted for by pre and post beliefs. In both
conditions, post beliefs are a better predictor of pre recollections than the actual pre beliefs. In
the post first condition, post beliefs accounted for significant variance in recollections over and
above pre beliefs, partial r = .60, F (1, 40) = 23.15, p<. 0001. Pre beliefs did not significantly
predict recollections, however, partial r = -.11, ns. In the recollection first condition, post beliefs
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again accounted for significant variance in recollections, partial r = .42, F (1, 40) = 14.98, p<.
0001. Pre beliefs did not significantly predict recollections, partial r = .15, ns.
Reminders of Previous Beliefs
Subjects who were reminded of their previous beliefs showed much smaller shifts from
their original beliefs within in both texts. Mean belief change for subjects within this condition
was 1.72 (Table 2). Table 1 clearly shows belief change as being significantly less for subjects
who are reminded of pre beliefs before reporting new beliefs compared to the first two
conditions. In the Pre belief given condition, belief ratings were significantly more similar to pre
beliefs than in the two recollection conditions, F (1, 132) = 4.84, p = .03.
Interest in Seeking New Information
For article interest ratings, the mean of the three Yes and three No article titles were
calculated. As shown in Table 3 and Figure 3, belief change from pre to post did not predict
interest in Yes (r = -.06, ns) or No (r = -.09, ns) article titles. The magnitude of subjects’
recollection error, however, negatively correlated with interest in both Yes (r = -.22, p=. 04) and
No (r = -.23, p=. 01) article ratings (see Figure 4). Ratings of Yes and No article titles were
highly correlated (r=.77, p=.00). As a result we combined both into a single scale and found that
the magnitude of recollection error and the mean rating both position consistent and inconsistent
article titles were negatively correlated (r=-.26, p=.01). Thus, subjects who were more accurate
in reporting that their beliefs had changed were more interested in reading articles that were both
consistent and inconsistent with their previous beliefs.
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Discussion

We first replicated previous belief recollection bias findings (Goethals & Reckman, 1973;
Levine, 1997; Levine & Safer, 2002; Ross, 1989; Wolfe, 2013), primarily the belief recollection
error finding of Wolfe (2013) in scientific text comprehension. Subjects changed beliefs in the
direction of the text position, and then misrecollected their previous beliefs. An important
question we addressed in this study concerned the nature of this recollection bias. Two common
explanations are that this is a product of a genuine memory error, meaning that recollections are
made using the most currently available mental representation held by the subject (Levine &
Safer, 2002; Ross, 1989) or that the bias is socially motivated by a desire to appear consistent
(Gawronski & Strack, 2012).
Implicit Theories of Stability
The research of Ross (1989) suggests that individuals tend to assume their attitudes are
consistent over time. Current beliefs bias our ability to accurately recollect earlier ones because
people tend to view their attitudes and beliefs as things that are relatively stable across time.
Even when beliefs change, individuals are not always aware that they have in fact changed,
because they typically adopt an implicit theory of stability when reconstructing their past. So,
when people base their current attitudes or beliefs on their current mental representation and
available information, they tend to already harbor this theory of stability, which creates a bias in
recollection. Even those who do not first state their new belief before remembering their earlier
one still experience the same distortion of memory. We find supporting evidence that when
beliefs change, it is not always salient to the subject. When subjects recollected their previous
belief before reporting their post belief, recollection errors and current beliefs did not change
compared to when post beliefs were reported first. It is not clear whether other circumstances
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exist where recollection accuracy may be improved. Nevertheless, we have no evidence that
recollection of previous beliefs can be improved compared to previous studies.
Desire for Consistency
Subjects who were reminded of their original belief reported significantly less of a
change in their belief compared to the other two experimental conditions (Figure 2). This finding
expands upon the understanding of belief change and recollection by suggesting that social
factors affect explicit belief change in a way to appear consistent over time. When subjects were
told their previous beliefs, they reported less belief change than when they were not. This result
is consistent with a desire to appear consistent across time. However, further research is needed
to rule out the possibility that providing previous beliefs merely serves as additional information
that subjects have difficulty ignoring when reporting current beliefs. It may be that subjects
experienced much less of a change in belief because the reminder of their previous belief was
given to them orally from an experimenter. The presence of a presumed authority figure (an
experimenter) to a naïve subject may induce are greater need to appear to be consistent as
opposed to if subjects were simply reminded of their old beliefs by means of a computer prompt.
We may see less of a difference of belief change if the subjects reported a discrepancy between
their past and present attitudes anonymously.
Consequences of Belief Memory Bias
The article rating data provide an initial suggestion about the value of understanding
when beliefs have changed. The high correlation of interest in both “Yes” and “No” article titles
suggest that overall interest in any new information may be a predictor of belief memory bias
magnitude. Students who were more accurate in their recollection of previous beliefs showed
more of an interest in reading information that was both consistent and inconsistent with their
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currently held beliefs (Figure 4). This suggests that those who are aware that their beliefs have
changed may be more open to reading texts with a broader range of positions on contentious
topics. Interest in seeking new information did not predict belief change however, so we cannot
assume that those who are more likely to seek out new information change their beliefs any less
than those who do not. The relationship between article interest and recollection bias does
suggest that those with a desire to learn more about a subject are less likely to so quickly assume
a stability mindset. Further research is needed to determine if perhaps the desire for new
information can predict more or less change in attitudes and beliefs. Furthermore it would be
interesting to investigate how social motivators such as impression management and cognitive
dissonance may affect interest in seeking out new information, both consistent and inconsistent
with how the subject feels at the present time.

BELIEF MEMORY BIAS

18
References

Bem, D. J., & McConnell, H. K. (1970). Testing the self-perception explanation of dissonance
phenomena: On the salience of premanipulation attitudes. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 14(1), 23-31. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0020916
Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000). The construction of autobiographical
memories in the self-memory system. Psychological Review, 107(2), 261-288.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.107.2.261
Cunningham, W. A., Preacher, K. J., & Banaji, M. R. (2001). Implicit attitude measures:
Consistency, stability, and convergent validity. Psychological Science, 12(2), 163-170.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00328
Fazio, R. H., & Olson, M. A. (2003). Implicit measures in social cognition research: Their
meaning and use. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 297-327.
Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford University Press. Stanford,
CA.
Gawronski, B., & Strack, F. (2004). On the propositional nature of cognitive consistency:
Dissonance changes explicit, but not implicit attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 40(4), 535-542.
Goethals, G. R., & Reckman, R. F. (1973). The perception of consistency in attitudes. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 9(6), 491-501. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/00221031(73)90030-9
Levine, L. J. (1997). Reconstructing memory for emotions. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 126(2), 165-177. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.126.2.165

BELIEF MEMORY BIAS

19

Levine, L. J., Lench, H. C., & Safer, M. A. (2009). Functions of remembering and
misremembering emotion. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 23(8), 1059-1075.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/acp.1610
Levine, L. J., Prohaska, V., Burgess, S. L., Rice, J. A., & Laulhere, T. M. (2001). Remembering
past emotions: The role of current appraisals. Cognition and Emotion, 15(4), 393-417.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0269993004200240
Levine, L. J., & Safer, M. A. (2002). Sources of bias in memory for emotions. Current Directions
in Psychological Science, 11(5), 169-173. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00193
McFarland, C., & Ross, M. (1987). The relation between current impressions and memories of
self and dating partners. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 13(2), 228-238.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167287132008
Pearson, R. W., Ross, M. A., & Dawes, R. M. (1992). Personal recall and the limits of
retrospective questions in surveys. Questions about questions: Inquiries into the cognitive
bases of surveys (pp. 65-94). New York, NY, US: Russell Sage Foundation, New York, NY.
Ross, M. (1989). Relation of implicit theories to the construction of personal histories.
Psychological Review, 96(2), 341.
Ross, M., & Conway, M. (1986). Remembering one's own past: The construction of personal
histories. New York, NY, US: Guilford Press, New York, NY.
Ross, M., McFarland, C., & Fletcher, G. J. O. (2008). The effect of attitude on the recall of
personal histories. Attitudes: Their structure, function, and consequences (pp. 347-355).
New York, NY, US: Psychology Press, New York, NY.
Ross, M., & Newby-Clark, I. R. (1998). Construing the past and future. Social Cognition, 16(1),
133-150.

BELIEF MEMORY BIAS

20

Rydell, R. J., & McConnell, A. R. (2010). Consistency and inconsistency in implicit social
cognition: The case of implicit and explicit measures of attitudes. New York, NY, US:
Guilford Press, New York, NY.
Rydell, R. J., McConnell, A. R., Mackie, D. M., & Strain, L. M. (2006). Of two minds: Forming
and changing valence-inconsistent implicit and explicit attitudes. Psychological Science,
17(11), 954-958. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40064486
Safer, M. A., Levine, L. J., & Drapalski, A. L. (2002). Distortion in memory for emotions: The
contributions of personality and post-event knowledge. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 28(11), 1495-1507. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014616702237577
Sinatra, G. M. (2005). The "warming trend" in conceptual change research: The legacy of Paul
R. Pintrich. Educational Psychologist, 40(2), 107-115.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15326985ep4002_5
Wolfe, M. B. W. (2005). Memory for narrative and expository text: Independent influences of
semantic associations and text organization. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 31(2), 359-364. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.31.2.359
Wolfe, M. B. (July, 2013). Oh, I’ve always believed that: Biased memory for previous beliefs
following belief change. Paper presented at the conference of the Society for Text &
Discourse, Valencia, Spain.

BELIEF MEMORY BIAS

21
Tables

Table 1
Belief change and recollection bias among TV violence and filler topics.
Topic

Belief change (Std. Dev.)

Recollection bias (Std. Dev.)

TV violence***

2.73 (1.91)

1.97 (1.67)

Homosexuality
Social media

.94 (1.18)
1.01 (1.51)

.68 (1.05)
.90 (1.28)

Spanking

1.03 (1.49)

.77 (1.22)

Note: Belief change and recollection bias measures were significantly higher for the topic of TV
violence compared to the filler topics suggesting the manipulation did in fact cause subjects to
shift their beliefs towards the text position.
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Table 2
Belief change and recollection bias for TV violence among all three conditions after combining
believers and disbelievers
Current belief first

Recollection first

Pre-belief given

Belief change

2.51

2.73

1.72

Recollection bias

1.47

1.98

Note: Belief change for the current first and recollection first conditions did not differ
significantly from each other. However, there is a significant difference of belief change for these
two conditions compared to the pre-belief given condition. For a graphic representation of this
data, see Figure 2.
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Table 3
Belief change and recollection error correlations with article interest for Yes and No titles
“Yes” Title Ratings

“No” Title Ratings

-.17

-.02

-.39*

-.09

.05
-.16

-.18
-.32

Believers (No Text)
Belief Change
Recollection Bias
Disbelievers (Yes Text)
Belief Change
Recollection Bias

Note: (*p<.05) Correlations between belief change and interest in article titles are not present. A
significant correlation is present between recollection bias and article interest. Ratings of yes and
no article titles were highly correlated (r=.77). As a result ratings were combined into a single
scale that measured overall interest in seeking new information and correlated with magnitude of
recollection bias (see Figure 4).
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Figure 1. Visual diagram of all three conditions and their manipulations during time 2 following
the belief inconsistent text. Orders of recollection and reporting new belief are manipulated for
the first two conditions and a reminder of previous beliefs are given to the third condition.
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Figure 2. Belief change and recollection bias scores for each condition. Believers (“Yes” text)
and disbelievers (“No” text) have been combined so data is separated by condition rather than by
text read. No significant difference of belief change or recollection bias is shown between the
first two conditions. However, a significant difference for belief change between the first two
conditions and subjects who were reminded of their earlier belief is present.
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Figure 3. No significant correlation is present between mean article interest rating and magnitude
of belief change.
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Figure 4. Magnitude of article interest for both yes and no article titles correlated with magnitude
of recollection error between both post-belief first and pre-belief first conditions (r=-.27, p=.01).

